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L e m s  m o d  B a r f i e l d
on ImmginarloB
Stephen ThoRson
About 12 years ago, Owen Barfield was asked to speak on the topic "Lewis, Truth, and Imagination." He com­
mented, "
How effortlessly Lewis could use his imagination, and 
with what success!... [But] the use of the imagination is 
one thing: a theory of imagination is another. For a theory 
of imagination must concern itself, whether positively or 
negatively, with its relation to truth.
Barfield reminded his audience that he and Lewis had had 
a "special, and rather protracted, tussle" over that very 
question when both were young. This, of course, was their 
1920s "Great War," as Lewis called it Surprised by Joy. 
Regarding Lewis' view after his conversion, Barfield 
commented, "If he no longer denied, as he had done at the 
time of the tussle, that imagination had a positive relation 
to truth, he was disinclined to give any attention to it." The 
implication is that Lewis later accepted a positive relation­
ship between imagination and truth. On a different 
occasion, however, Barfield has stated flatly that the later 
Lewis "held that imagination has nothing to do with 
knowledge."1 At first glance these two statements by 
Barfield appear to be contradictory. But in fact, both 
statements are true. How can this be?
To answer that we must take a closer look at the impor­
tance of imagination in Lewis' epistemology: the place of 
the imagination in his view of "how we know." A careful 
distinction must be made between Lewis' pre-conversion 
view during the "Great War" and Lewis' view as it 
changed after his conversion to Christianity.
2
In 1924 a poem by Lewis was published in The Beacon. 
Lewis titled the poem "Joy," but used the term "Beauty" 
interchangably with Joy. It described, of course, that recur­
rent transitory experience Lewis called Imagination in his 
unpublished Summa and Desire in The Pilgrim's Regress. 
"To-day was all unlike another day / ... As I woke. / Like 
a huge bird. Joy with the feathery stroke / Of strange 
wings brushed me over. Sweeter air / Came never from 
dawn's heart." Four lines have special significance for the 
discussion at hand.
We do not know the language Beauty speaks,
She has no answer to our questioning,
And ease to pain and truth to one who seeks 
I know she never brought and cannot bring.
One cannot find a claerer statement of Lewis' view of 
Imagination at the beginning of the "Great War." Beauty
(or Joy, or Imagination) cannot bring truth. Lewis did not 
even "know the language Beauty speaks."
Barfield, on the other hand, thought he did know the 
language "Beauty speaks." His thesis for the degree of 
B. Lift, was all about that language as it was found in 
poetry. It was eventually published as Poetic Diction in 
1928, but begun as early as 1922. In fact, the arguments in 
that book provided the material for much of the "Great 
War" debate. The book focused on the very question 
Barfield considered so crucial to any theory of imagination 
— What is the relation of imagination to truth and 
knowledge?
Barfield: Imagination as Knowledge
In Poetic Diction, Barfield limited his attention to 
aesthetic experience as found in poetry, calling this poetic 
imagination. Barfield defined poetic imagination as a "felt 
change of consciousness" (PD, 48), further defining this 
change as an "expansion" of consciousness, resulting in 
"knowledge" (PD, 55). In poetry, this new knowledge 
comes to us through metaphors, which enable us to 
recognize "resemblances and analogies," allowing us to 
see meaning we could not see before. Barfield believed that 
"the poet makes the terms" which carry this new meaning. 
He denied that logic or rational thinking could make new 
meaning or knowledge; it could only help us become more 
aware of the meaning or truth "already implicit in the 
words, ... deposited or imported by the poetic activity" 
(PD, 31).
Subtitled A Study in Meaning, the book argued for the 
essential role of imagination in the creation of meaning.
Language does indeed appear historically as an endless 
process of metaphor transforming itself into meaning. 
Seeking for material in which to incarnate its last inspira­
tion, imagination seizes on a suitable word or phrase, 
uses it as a metaphor, and so creates meaning... inspira­
tion grasping the hitherto unapprehended, and imagina­
tion relating it to the already known. (PD,140-141)
Thus imagination is not only a way or path toward 
knowledge, but the only way toward new knowledge of 
reality.
In 1929 Barfield read an address before the Lotus Club 
at Oxford which was later published as the first essay in 
Barfield's Romanticism Comes o f Age. He began with an 
assertion that was not only central to this volume of essays, 
but to his entire thought regarding poetic imagination —
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that the Romantic Movement never "came of age", 
because the English Romantics never developed a 
philosophical base for their high view of imagination.3 "To 
make Romanticism into a self-sufficient organic being... 
there ought to have been added to the new concept, 
beauty, to the renewed conception of freedom, a new idea 
also of the nature of truth" (RCA, 28). Of course Romantics 
such as Shelley and Keats claimed that imagination (poetic 
imagination) "bears some special relation to Truth," but 
they did not even ask, much less answer, the question: "In 
what way is Imagination true?" Even Coleridge, who had 
proposed a very high view of Imagination indeed, failed 
to complete his philosophical essay on the nature of 
Imagination and its relation to truth.
Coleridge's thought about poetry and imagination 
became central to Barfield's own views. In his What 
Coleridge Thought, one would be hard put to find any major 
(or even minor) difference between Barfield and 
Coleridge, at least as Barfield has interpreted him.4 In a few 
paragraphs it is impossible to do justice to a topic requiring 
an entire book by Barfield to explain, but some attempt 
must be made. We can simplify matters by limiting our 
discussion to the topic of Imagination alone.5
Coleridge distinguished a primary Imagination from a 
secondary Imagination. This distinction must be quoted in full:
The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power 
and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I con­
sider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the con­
scious will, yet still identical with the former in the kind 
of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode 
of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order 
to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, 
yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify, 
(quoted in WCT,74)
This certainly is consistent with Barfield's view of 
imagination. What may not be clear at this point is that 
Lewis also supported this view toward the end of the 
"Great War." To see that fact, Coleridge must be under­
stood as Barfield interpreted him.
Barfield accepted the view of Being described in the 
Lewis' Summa, Part I, i.e. that the soul is projected or emerges 
from Spirit, such that each soul can say that it is, at some level, 
Spirit. Barfield himself stated, "'I', while remaining one of the 
parts, must also be in some sense, the Whole."6 Along with the 
subjective soul, however, the world of Nature is also 
projected from Spirit. Therefore Lewis had said that the 
world also "is the creation of what I, at some level, am" 
(Summa, I, xii). Similarly, Coleridge wrote that "of all we see, 
hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in oursel­
ves" (WCT, 80). For both Coleridge and Barfield the world of 
Nature is the unconscious mind of man.7
In this system, then, Coleridge's primary Imagination 
actually is this separation of the soul from the world of 
Nature around us ("the eternal act of creation"). Normally 
this is unconscious. It becomes secondary, Barfield said,
"when it is rai sed to, or nearer to, the level of consciousness 
and therewith becomes expressible" (WCT, 77). What 
becomes expressible is the organic relation between man and 
nature, the "oneness" that truly exists between man and 
nature in this philosophical system, a "unity in multeity."
While, then, imagination at its primary stage 
empowers experience of an outer world at all, at its secon­
dary stage it both expresses and empowers experience of 
that outer world as the productive 'unity in multeity,' 
which results in a whole and parts organically related to 
one another (WCT, 81).
It is this vision of essential oneness between man and the 
world of Nature that the Romantics attempted to express, 
to re-create, in their work.
In the preface to the second edition of Poetic Diction 
Barfield argued that "as the secondary imagination makes 
meaning, so the primary imagination makes 'things'" (PD, 
31). During the "Great War" it was the secondary 
Imagination, the making of meaning which was in 
dispute. What is the nature of this meaning? Can this 
meaning show Truth about reality? If so, does it always do 
so? And if not always, how can we know when to trust it?
In Poetic Diction, Barfield only hinted at the answers to 
some of these questions. For example, he noted the 
necessity for poets to develop the "presence of mind" 
required to judge their visions and words while still 
remaining in the imaginative experience (PD, 209). He did 
not tell his readers how to develop that "presence of 
mind". But he believed that a method was available — 
Steiner's Anthroposophical training.
In England Barfield had looked in vain for the 
philosophical maturing or the "coming of age" of the 
Romantic Movement. In Germany, however, Barfield 
found what he was looking for. Steiner had developed 
from Goethe a method of knowledge which was, essential­
ly, "systematicimagination" (RCA, 37). In Anthroposophy, 
Barfield had found a philosophy that included a place for 
Imagination, as well as a method for using that Imagina­
tion to obtain new knowledge of spiritual reality. And 
because all reality is in fact "spiritual," new knowledge of 
so-called physical reality can be obtained as well.
There are three stages to the Anthroposophical Way: 
Imagination, Inspiration, and Intuition. Considered as the 
first stage of Anthroposophical training, Imagination does 
not seem precisely the same term as used by Coleridge or 
when used by Barfield himself in the term "poetic imagina­
tion." This first stage of Steiner's method is a "systematic 
imagination," involving concentration and meditation. 
Systematic imagination results in a sort of "picture- 
consciousness, a vigilant dreaming," which is only a 
"semblance of truth". It is only at the second stage of 
Inspiration, that "the perceptive faculty itself is enhanced in 
a way that begins to have objective value for cognition" 
(RCA, 16). During the "Great War", Barfield explained to 
Lewis that the Poet merely "feels" the truth of a metaphor, 
but does not "know" it like the trained Anthroposophist 
at the second stage (Replicit, p .ll).
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It is this second stage, and the third, Intuition, that 
chiefly interested Barfield, since Steiner claimed that this 
method or Way not only resulted in a true knowledge of 
reality, but also provided a way to influence that reality. 
Barfield had discussed this method with Lewis during the 
"Great War", noting Steiner's distinction between our 
"sensible" awareness and the "super-sensible" awareness 
of the trained Anthroposophist. But Lewis rejected out of 
hand any belief that seemed to him to be derived from 
authority alone. He distrusted the "super-sensible" world 
of Steiner, suspecting it was not more "real" than the com­
mon phenomenal world, but rather just more phenomena 
(and dangerous because it was not recognized as such).
Therefore, most of the "Great War" did not center on 
the Anthroposophical Way, but on that experience which 
was common to both Barfield and Lewis — that particular 
recurrent experience which Lewis called Joy and Barfield 
called Poetic Imagination. This was their common ground.
Lewis: Imagination as Spiritual Awareness
While in his teens, Lewis had attempted to believe in 
a materialistic world view, which excluded any meaning­
ful place for his experiences of Joy, or even of Beauty. He 
could not keep denying that Beauty had meaning, how­
ever. As he told Greeves in one of this letters at the time, 
"I have formulated my equation Matter=Nature=Satan, 
and on the other side Beauty, the only spiritual and non­
material thing that I have yet found" (TST,214). He in­
cluded this concept in his book of poems, Spirits in Bondage, 
published in 1919. In the poem, "Song", he said, "Atoms 
dead could never thus/ Stir the human heart of us/ Unless 
the beauty that we see/ The veil of endless beauty be/..." 
(SiB, 51). Lewis had sent this poem to Greeves before its 
publication. Commenting on it, he said, "The beauty there­
fore is not in the matter at all, but is something purely 
spiritual, arising mysteriously out of some indwelling 
spirit behind the matter of the tree..." (TST, 217).
At this time Lewis did not always distinguish Beauty 
from his transitory experiences of Joy. "The conviction is 
gaining ground on me that after all Spirit does exist; and 
that we come into contact with the spiritual element by 
means of these 'thrills'." He began to believe that "Some­
thing right outside time and space" did exist, and that 
"Beauty is the call of the spirit in that something to the 
spirit in us" (TST, 217).
And yet in Surprised by Joy Lewis made clear that at the 
start of his "Great War" with Barfield he had retreated 
from these vague beliefs. He had become a "realist," 
accepting "as rock-bottom reality the universe revealed by 
the senses" (SbJ, 208). Years later Lewis gave Barfield the 
credit for a major shift in his thought during their "Great 
War". Barfield pointed out to Lewis that such "realism" 
was inconsistent with his desire to claim that logical 
thought led to truth, that moral judgement was objective, 
and that aesthetic experience was "valuable."
Notice that Lewis did not end up saying, as Barfield 
did, that aesthetic experience leads to knowledge or truth.
He did not accept Barfield's view of Imagination as a way 
toward knowledge. But neither did he wish to accept a 
Crocean alternative in which art is completely divorced 
from knowledge. He desired to maintain that his 
experiences of Joy or poetic imagination were "valuable."
He thought that his new idealist position had provided 
him a way to do so, and attempted to convince Barfield in 
his Summa. In Part I of the Summa he detailed his view of 
Being — (i.e. the evolution of soul from Spirit), but along 
the way he made a few comments of importance for his 
view of Imagination. In Section x he said, "The analogy 
between cosmic and artistic creation is more than an anal­
ogy, the latter being simply the lowest grade of the 
former." This is straight out of Coleridge's view of primary 
and secondary Imagination, of course. Based on this iden­
tity in kind between artistic and cosmic creation, he stated 
in Section xvii that because God creates by an act of im­
agination, God cannot be different than himself. Further, 
he wrote that God imagines men's souls and the world 
they live in, and that in some sense, he himself actually is 
God. Note that for Lewis the term "creation" here meant 
an evolution of both soul and the world of Nature from 
Spirit. In Section xx, Lewis distinguished two image­
making faculties, dismissing Phantasy as a lesser faculty 
since it is limited to the material of memory. But Spirit has 
no raw material outside itself, and must make an image by 
separation of his own substance. Again this echoes 
Coleridge (and Barfield) closely (WCT, 75-76).
In Part II, "Value," Lewis settled down to the business 
of showing Imagination to be valuable. Although recog­
nizing that his view of Being implied that all souls and all 
moments must be considered "spiritual," Lewis wished to 
keep the word as a useful term of approval for a "higher" 
or "better" life. For Lewis becoming more spiritual was a 
reawakening or a consciousness of one's participation in 
Spirit (Sec. ii). The creation of a resisting matter inevitably 
brings pleasure and pain, and therefore the passions. The 
Spirit only has a limited view through souls, all of whom 
are corrupted by passions. By great struggle, however, 
human souls can fulfill their goal to multiply conscious­
ness from a diversity of viewpoints to add richness to the 
life of the Spirit (Sec. iii). Therefore, "The approximation 
of souls to their qualitative equality with the consciousness 
of Spirit constitutes their spirituality" (Sec. iv). This is the 
primary definition of "spirituality" and was the basis for 
his view of Imagination as "Spiritual Awareness," not 
knowledge. Even in the 1950's Lewis described his earlier 
view of the spiritual life this way. The goal of man was to 
"multiply the consciousness of Spirit... while yet 
remaining qualitatively the same as Spirit" (SbJ, 225).
Lewis defined two Modes of the Spiritual life. The First 
is the Practical Mode, commonly called Virtue or Morality. 
The second is the Theoretical Mode, of which there are 
many examples. Potentially, each Mode has two stages. 
The difference between the two stages is similar to the 
difference between Coleridge's primary and secondary 
Imagination as Barfield interpreted it, i.e. the secondary
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stage involves an increased consciousness of, and participa­
tion in, that which was unconscious at the first stage (WCT, 
75-78). He states that the first stage of the Practical Mode is to 
will to do right.8 The second stage is to realize that this inner 
law of right willing (at first appearing as a command coming 
from outside die self) is actually what one really wills at the 
deepest level. Thus the second stage involves a hightened 
"spirituality", which Lewis had just defined as an 
"approximation of souls to their qualitative equality with the 
consciousness of Spirit" (Sec. iv). A little later he defined it as 
a "conscious participation" in Spirit (Sec. ix).
Lewis ended a lengthy discussion of the Theoretical 
Modes of the spiritual life by summarizing: the supreme 
mode of the spiritual life must be as universal as Science, 
as concrete as History, as disinterested as Art, and as free 
from "the great primary abstraction" as Philosophy is. But 
it must also, like Charity, consciously cooperate with 
Spirit. Is there, he asked, a faculty for seeing any and every 
part of our environment as art does unreal objects and 
charity does special objects? If so, such a faculty would 
fulfill the ideal function of the spiritual life. Souls would 
become like clear spectacles for Spirit to see through, and 
thus multiply the consciousness of Spirit without corrup­
tion (Sec. xi).
Needless to say, Lewis believed there was such a 
faculty. After long and careful preparation, Lewis finally 
revealed his candidate for the highest mode of the spiritual 
life — Imagination.
It may appear to us as a rediscovery, as if we came home 
after a long exile: because we are indeed coming to recog­
nise that we are Spirit and are everywhere in our own 
country and our own house. Or it may appear to us as a 
longing which is also fruition, and a losing which is also 
keeping, because we then veritably become aware of our 
dual nature and our division from ourself, which we are 
at once the Spirit that possesses all and the soul that is 
abandoning that possession... Others feel that what 
seemed dead things are charged with life, and people the 
hills and trees with vague personality: nor are they wrong, 
for we share the life of the Spirit which knows itself alive 
beneath all its vesture. But all alike know that such mo­
ments are our highest life. For their continuation would 
be the redemption of the world... This highest form of the 
spiritual life I  call Imagination. (Sec. xiii)
He went on to describe the transitory nature of Im­
agination as it is seen in the experiences of mystics, in the 
epiphanies described by some, or even in the moments of 
insight experienced by philosophers and scientists. 
Elsewhere, as we have see, he called these moments, 'Joy."
In a later section of the Summa, Lewis defined Imagina­
tion as "the activity of discerning as Spirit" (Sec. xviii). For 
the Lewis who wrote the Summa, Imagination meant 
Spiritual Awareness. And this Spiritual Awareness was a 
consciousness of the soul's oneness with universal Spirit 
as well as the soul's oneness with the world of Nature, both 
of which are the product of a separative evolution from 
that same Spirit. Thus, we see that Lewis' view of 
Imagination was based firmly on his view of Being.
The same cannot be said for his view of knowledge and 
truth, however. Shortly before writing his Summa, Lewis 
had come across a very important concept. It came to 
displace in importance his experience of Joy in the 
formulation of his theory of knowledge. He had read in 
Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity of Alexander's 
distinction between "Enjoyment" and "Contemplation"9 
As it is crucial to understand it, I will quote at length Lewis' 
discussion of the concept.
When you see a table you "enjoy" the act of seeing and 
"contemplate" the table. Later, if you took up Optics and 
thought about Seeing itself, you would be contemplating 
the seeing and enjoying the thought... I accepted this 
distinction at once and have ever since regarded it as an 
indispensible tool of thought. A moment later its conse­
quences — for me quite catastrophic— began to appear.
It seemed to me self-evident that one essential property 
of love, hate, fear, hope, or desire was attention to their 
object. In other words, the enjoyment and contemplation 
of our inner activities are incompatible... Of course the 
two activities can and do alternate with great rapidity; 
but they are distinct and incompatible. This was not 
merely a logical result of Alexander's analysis, but could 
be verified in daily and hourly experience. (Sbf, 217-218)
But I must quote his comments a bit further on.
It followed that all introspection is in one respect mis­
leading. In introspection we try to look "inside oursel­
ves" and see what is going on. But nearly everything that 
was going on a moment before is stopped by the very act 
of our turning to look at it. Unfortunately this does not 
mean that introspection finds nothing. On the contrary, 
it finds precisely what is left behind by the suspension of 
all our normal activities; and what is left behind is mainly 
mental images and physical sensations. (SbJ, 218)
These two passages are extremely important for our 
understanding of Lewis' epistemology. For this concept— 
the enjoyment/contemplation distinction —  became the 
cornerstone for Lewis' theory of knowledge, and Lewis 
had incorporated this concept into his view of Being in the 
first part of the Summa: "The Spirit is pure subject and can 
only be enjoyed, never contemplated" (I,iv). This allowed 
him to deny several beliefs of Anthroposophy regarding 
communication or travel to other or higher spiritual 
worlds, as well as any communication between soul and 
Spirit. It also allowed him to deny Barfield's (and 
Anthroposophy's) view of Imagination as a path toward 
true knowledge. The emphasis of a previous article of mine 
was mainly on how this enjoyment/contemplation 
distinction was not consistent with Lewis' view of the 
soul's evolution from Spirit.10 Barfield's initial responses 
to the Summa tended in that direction. In this article we will 
emphasize how Alexander's enjoyment/contemplation 
distinction was inconsistent with Lewis' high view of 
Imagination.
Almost immediately after his eloquent description of 
Imagination (for which Barfield in his Replicit wrote 
profusive thanks), Lewis plunged into several more 
sections aimed against Anthroposophy. He made good use 
of his enjoyment/contemplation distinction. He stated that we
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cannot see spiritually by turning our eyes inward, but only 
through turning our eyes outward. We should not strive 
to examine our own souls but to enjoy Spirit by con­
templating external things, such as the world, art, 
philosophy, history, or imagination. Souls that are 
introspective are, Lewis felt, in danger of the foolishness 
of ascetic practices or its opposite lawlessness, or even 
liable to a major reaction like "the dark night of the soul" 
described by some mystics. The spiritual life, like Spirit, 
must look outward. Since to live spiritually is to see things 
as Spirit sees them, not as our passions show them, Lewis 
rejected any concern for one's own spiritual life as itself 
unspiritual (Sec. xv, xxiv).
Further, he emphasized the disinterestedness which 
must be a mark of the spiritual life. He resisted any attempt 
to show that any particular thing had "empirical value" 
for his life. Value can only arise through an object because 
of its relationship with Spirit; attributing that value to the 
object itself is Idolatry. Therefore, he wrote that if the 
actual existence of heaven and hell, or of the God of the 
Christians could be demonstrated, it would become 
impossible to consider them in a spiritual way (Sec.xvi). 
Lewis regarded Religion as mostly Idolatry mixed with 
false opinions about facts. But at times Religion may 
actually be Charity with false opinion; in that case,the false 
opinions would not take away the spirituality. Even 
Charity will cease to be spiritual, however, if it is practised 
in deference to a god's external command (Sec.xvii).
Lewis long held that any motive to do right based on 
a commandment from without or based on what the doer 
would receive in reward was actually unspiritual. This 
discussion of Idolatry was important for his attack on 
Anthroposophy, since Lewis believed Anthroposophists 
to be anything but disinterested; years earlier, he had 
suspected that some adherants to Anthroposophy were 
attracted by "the sugar plum of promised immortality" or 
"comfort." 1 He could not see himself accepting a 
philosophy that promised to lead to "supersensible" 
knowledge or reality without that acceptance being 
tainted with wrong motives (Sbf, 206-207).
The concept of Idolatry also had direct relevance for 
Lewis' denial of Imagination as a source of knowledge. For 
example, Lewis considered it Idolatry to mistake a myth 
or symbol as factually true. For this would be to attribute 
empiric value to something which has contingent value. 
Imagination ("the activity of discerning as Spirit") does not 
need justification, he stated. There can be no reasons from 
outside the spiritual itself that can justify it. Value is ab­
solute, not empirical (Sec. xviii,xxii).
Lewis proposed that Imagination can take any first 
degree mode and convert it into one of the second degree 
(i.e. make it more spiritual), but that Art can be 
transformed the easiest. "Imagination is par excellence the 
content of Art," and Art is "par excellence the vehicle of 
imagination." By definition the result is imaginative art, 
an art which is consciously spiritual. Imaginative art is 
superior because it brings about an actual formation of
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concrete experience, not just a conceptual statement from 
that experience (Sec. xix).
Lewis' special interest was imaginative fiction. 
Imaginative fiction created consciously by the artist he 
called "symbolism," that created unconsciously by a 
group or people he called "myth." Elaborating further, 
Lewis noted the relation of symbol and myth to metaphor. 
With all three "an experience of one kind [is] expressed, 
and enriched, by the supposal or suggestion (not the 
actualisation) of an experience of another kind" (Sec. xx). 
With the removal of the parenthetical remark, Barfield 
himself could have written that definition.
In Sections xx and xxi toward the end of the Summa, 
the conflict between Lewis' view of knowledge and his 
view of Imagination becomes more obvious. On the one 
hand, his claims for Imagination as Spiritual Awareness 
were very high. He stated that a poet who experiences a 
landscape imaginatively also "consciously cooperates 
with Spirit in making that landscape"; such a poet will 
naturally use metaphors while recording this spiritual 
experience, for "Spirit experiences all things ordered and 
articulated in a perfect unity." Spirit perceives the 
"absolute relevance... sees no object in isolation." Spirit can 
contemplate many things souls cannot, and in their context. 
The "suggestion of that context" or rather such "fragments 
allowed us by Space and Time... is metaphor," he 
proposed. The soul of man caught up in an imaginative 
experience (the highest Spiritual experience, remember) 
"sees as Spirit sees, wills as Spirit wills." When such a man 
returns from his imaginative experience, the remaining 
fragments of contexts could become (for him) a myth. So 
far so good.
But suddenly, Lewis paused to say that these 
fragments of "contextual experience" which become 
metaphors "need no experience of the objective world." 
They may be mere "subjective fantasies." In some way 
these subjective fantasies, as metaphors, allow us to "see 
the object more spiritually, that is, more really: but though 
they lend reality they do not receive it." The fact that 
metaphor makes such imaginative experiences more real 
does not prove them to be more than fantasies. Lewis 
broke the spell still further by flatly stating, "The existence 
of beings used as symbols (e.g. faires, etc.) is therefore to 
be handed over to the sciences for empirical inquiry." 
After all, truth must be objectively demonstrated.
What is happening? Handing fairies over to scientists 
for experimentation? We feel as if a dream has been rudely 
interrupted. The disturbance is more than emotional, 
however; something has happened to Lewis' argument. 
What exactly is left of Lewis' high view of Imagination?
If Spirit perceives "absolute relevance", sees all things 
"in perfect unity," then how can anything Spirit sees be 
really untrue? A distinction between metaphors 
associated with objective truth and those associated with 
subjective fantasies seems impossible to uphold —  at least 
with such a high view of Imagination. Lewis tried to 
salvage as much as he could, however. First, he extended
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Spirit's sight a bit. He agreed that we may see oaks more 
spiritually if we view them as "green-robed senators" in 
Keat's Hyperion. But that is because Spirit sees our fantasies 
in addition to the real world, and sees them also "in perfect 
unity" (Sec. xx). The metaphor itself does not have to be 
true, Lewis said. Although they "lend reality they do not 
receive it." Notice that he had been very careful in his 
definition of metaphor. Lewis maintained that whatever is 
true of imaginatative experience is not what is conveyed in 
metaphor, myth, or symbol. At worst they are only the 
residue left in the mind after the soul has returned from an 
experience of Imagination to a normal state. At best 
metaphor, myth, and symbol are only "fragments" or "sug­
gestions" of die context and unity which only Spirit sees.
Second, Lewis tried to show, for mythology at least, 
that being "untrue" was not a stumbling block, but rather 
its essential nature. He insisted again that if beings used as 
symbols were shown to actually exist, their symbolical 
value would be destroyed.12 For symbols are not given as 
facts to us, but taken "by free spiritual activity" (i.e. by 
Imagination). If factually true, such beings would be ob­
jects of fear or desire, giving them empirical value. They 
would need "to be 'disenchanted' i.e stripped of empirical 
value and condemned qua worldly terribles or desirables 
before they were 're-enchanted' by the spiritual point of 
view." Lewis went so far as to say that "if all mythology 
were proved as fact, the poets would throw it away and 
invent a new one, warranted untrue" (Sec. xxi).
In his Replicit, Barfield attacked both these attempts by 
Lewis to make his denial of truth to metaphor consistent 
with his high view of Imagination. If Imagination is a 
Spiritual Awareness or consciousness of the soul's oneness 
with universal Spirit as well as the soul's oneness with the 
world of Nature, then how can anything be merely 
"subjective"? Barfield pointed out that the universal 
"relevance" which all find in Spirit destroys the distinction 
between the objective and subjective. At the very least, he 
said, subjective fancies becomes objective when given 
form and placed in memory. Further, Barfield disputed the 
claim that a myth found to be true would be deprived of 
symbolic value. He pointed out that this flatly contradicts 
Lewis' earlier statement (in Sec. xiii) that during moments 
of Imagination Spirit knows itself alive under the vesture 
of the natural world. Therefore, the natural vesture can 
become symbolic. If Imagination is 'taking7 the symbol, 
then the symbol is actually 'taken' by Spirit — and there­
fore is also 'given' to the soul. In other words, Lewis' view 
of Imagination, based as it was on his view of Being, 
implied some sort of reality to all that is experienced via 
Imagination.1
In Part I of the Sumtna Lewis was primarily concerned 
with establishing his particular idealist view of Being. In 
Part II, he was primarily trying to show the pre-eminence 
of Imagination in the spiritual life. It is only at the very end 
that his denial of truth to metaphor is brought in, seriously 
clashing with what he was built up so carefully 
beforehand. However, it was this very question of the 
truth of metaphor (and Imagination) that had been the
main point of argument in the "Great W ar" letters.14 W 
(Part II to be published in the next issue.) 
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Commedia: or rather a role. For it is precisely the point of 
the story to have Dante the pilgrim (and thus the reader) 
so recover a proper vision of the world that he will escape 
from it  At the beginning of the poem's action (described 
in Inferno II, 99 et seq.), it is St. Lucy, the patroness of those 
with afflicted sight, who acts as the messenger from the 
Blessed Virgin to Beatrice. Dante sees that the human race 
has been given that deathlessness for which it always 
longed, but he also learns the fairy-story lesson that death­
lessness in itself can be, even for Virgil, a torture: and he 
sees, we see, how to escape that torture — see it, in this 
moment, in the figure of Beatrice, and, in the end, in a flash 
beyond the power of fantasy, in an Enchantment of Love 
which draws him and us into the Primary Reality. K
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3. e.g., Inferno IV, 76-78; XIII, 52-54; XV, 85; Purgatorio XXI, 85.
4. p. 285. Curiously, Beatrice is not explicitly in voked in Inferno XVI, where
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signs of what happens to him.
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responding to a draft copy of the interview:
My reference to Dante was outrageous. I do not seriously 
dream of being measured against Dante, a supreme poet. At 
one time Lewis and 1 used to read him to one another. 1 was for 
awhile a member of the Oxford Dante Society (I think at the 
proposal of |C.S.| Lewis, who overestimated greatly my 
scholarship in Dante or Italian generally). It remains true that 
I found the 'pettiness' that I spoke of a sad blemish in places.
The letters of j.R.R. Tolkien, selected and edited by Humphrey 
Carpenter, with the assistance of Christopher Tolkien, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin (1981), p. 377.
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of Barfield, Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien (Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 
1972) takesa more "traditional" stance, i.e. Coleridge merely held that 
"by means of the Primary Imagination we 'create' the phenomenal 
world by our unconscious structuring of the Kantian noumena" (p. 
26). Barfield's view is more radical in that there seems to be nothing 
but phenomena (or "collective representations"); the "noumena" do 
not exist. No physical reality stands behind the phenomena, only 
something that could be called the "collective unconscious" (SA, 
153-154). Elsewhere Barfield said, "Nature unperceived is the uncon­
scious, sleeping being of humanity; just as Nature perceived is the 
self-reflection of waking humanity" (RCA, 210).
8. Morality for Lewis was not intrinsically superior to other modes of the
spiritual life, but was "pre-emptive" because it is concerned with 
action. Many have tried to trace Lewis' emphasis on morality to his 
Christian beliefs. But Lewis had placed morality as one of the highest 
modes of the spiritual life well before his Christian conversion. His 
acknowledged master in this area was Kant, not Christian revelation. 
Lewis stated in Part II of his Summa that a sound theory of ethics, such 
as Kant's, implied the metaphysics he had presented in Part I.
9. A recent edition is Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London:
Macmillan, 1966).
10. See my article, "Knowing and Being in C.S. Lewis' 'Great War' with 
Owen Barfield," CSL: The Bulletin o f the New York C.S. Lewis Society, 
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11. Letters, p. 89. After his conversion, Lewis pointed out that he had 
begun with no "belief in a future life". "1 now number it among my 
greatest mercies that I was permitted for several months, perhaps for 
a year, to know God and to attempt obedience without even raising 
that question... I have never seen how a preoccupation with that 
subject at the outset could fail to corrupt the whole thing" (Sbf, 231).
12. Lewis seems to have never lost his belief that this was true. In his "Is 
Theology Poetry?", published in 1945, Lewis said, "In a certain sense 
we spoil a mythology for imaginative purposes by believing in it" 
(WG, 77). By this time, however, he could caution against going too 
far. A believed mythology was spoiled only "in a certain sense", not 
in all senses. He admitted that many things we enjoy depend on their 
supposed reality in order to achieve their effect on us. Nonetheless, 
the kind of pleasure received is different.
13. Symptomatic of the fundamental problems in his argument, Lewis' 
distinction between Art and Imagination cannot be maintained. Ear­
lier in Part II, Lewis claimed that Art is only an "image" of the spiritual 
life because the objects of Art are not "real", and often are mere 
"subjective fancies" (Sec. viii). But in the concluding sections of Part 
II "subjective fantasies" have been made legitimate objects for Im­
agination, although they or their associated metaphors still are 
denied "reality" (Sec. xx).
14. The "Great War" letters were for the most part written before the 
Summa and the tractates that followed. However, the main point of 
disagreement in the letters only appears at the end of the Summa. 
Therefore, our examination of the "Great War" letters has been left 
till after our examination of Lewis' view of Being and Imagination in 
the Summa. This is perfectly consistent with Lewis' own opinion that 
metaphysics (the question of Being) is primary.
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